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Summary 
Accession of the EU to the ECHR has been subject to discussion since the 
late 1970s. Due to a lack of legal basis in the treaties, accession has not been 
possible until the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Article 
6(2) TEU now stipulates an obligation for the Union to accede to the 
Convention under the condition that the agreement relating to the accession 
makes provisions for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and 
Union law. 
 
Even though the EU has come a long way in developing its own 
fundamental rights protection regime, several reasons has been given for the 
Union to accede to the ECHR. Most importantly, it will represent a step 
toward a more coherent human rights regime within Europe as well as 
bringing within the scope of ECHR the acts of the institutions of the EU. 
 
The process of drafting an accession agreement has been long and complex 
as there has been several interest that the drafting group has had to respect, 
balance and sometime compromise.  Most notably, the requirement to draft 
an agreement that respects Union autonomy has forced the drafters to 
construct a rather complex legal framework in order to accommodate a 
federal-like international entity as the Union within the system of the 
Convention next to its own Member States. 
 
At the heart of the accession agreement lays the co-respondent mechanism, 
designed to solve the issue of correctly addressing ECtHR applications to 
the Member States and the Union respectively; and the institution of a 
process ensuring the involvement of Court of Justice prior to any 
proceedings before the ECtHR in which the EU will act as respondent or co-
respondent. Both the co-respondent mechanism and the process for prior 
involvement may be criticized for their complexity and that they put the 
Union in a privileged position compared to the other 47 high contracting 
parties of the Convention.   
 
Additionally, it could be said that the system set up by the draft accession 
agreement institutionalises and incentivises the continued application of the 
doctrine of equivalent protection established through the famous Bosphorus 
ruling. While the doctrine should not be upheld in its current shape and 
form, having regard to the specific nature of the European Union, a 
modified application of the deference shown through the doctrine seems 
likely, and perhaps even necessary, at least in cases where the EU has acted 
as a supranational entity and is involved in proceedings as co-respondent.  
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Sammanfattning 
EUs anslutning till Europakonventionen har varit föremål för diskussion 
ända sedan slutet av 1970-talet. På grund av bristande rättslig grund i 
fördragen, har anslutning dock inte varit möjligt förrän ikraftträdandet av 
Lissabonfördraget år 2009. Artikel 6(2) FEU föreskriver nu en skyldighet 
för EU att ansluta sig till konventionen under förutsättning att avtalet om 
Unionens anslutning avspeglar nödvändigheten att bevara unionens och 
unionsrättens särdrag.  
 
Trots att EU redan har ett välutvecklat skydd för grundläggande rättigheter, 
har flera anledningar lagts till grund för att unionen bör ansluta sig till 
Europakonventionen. Framförallt kommer unionens anslutning att innebära 
ett steg mot en mer sammanhållen ordning av mänskliga rättigheter inom 
Europa. Dessutom kommer EUs anslutning medföra att även EUs 
institutioner kommer att omfattas av Europakonventionens bestämmelser 
och kan ställas till svars inför Europadomstolen.  
 
Arbetet med att utforma ett anslutningsavtal har varit både tidskrävande och 
komplicerat. Den arbetsgrupp som har haft till uppgift att utforma avtalet 
har tvingats respektera, balansera och ibland kompromissa ett flertal, ibland 
motstående, intressen. Framförallt har kravet på att utarbeta ett avtal som 
respekterar unionens autonomi tvingat arbetsgruppen att konstruera ett 
relativt komplext rättsligt ramverk, anpassat för att rymma en federal-
liknande, internationell organisation som EU inom Europakonventionens 
system, jämte sina egna medlemsstater.  
 
I anslutningsavtalets kärna ligger den så kallade ”co-respondent-
mekanismen”, som är ämnad att lösa problemet med att korrekt adressera 
klagomål till Europadomstolens mellan medlemsstaterna och unionen; samt 
instiftandet av en process för att garantera att EU-domstolen involverats före 
ett förfarande vid Europadomstolen där EU ska delta som tilltalad eller så 
kallad ”co-respondent”. Både ”co-respondent-mekanismen” och den 
föreslagna processen för att garantera att EU-domstolen involveras kan 
kritiseras för deras komplexitet och att de sätter unionen i en privilegierad 
position jämfört med de 47 stater som redan är anslutna till konventionen. 
 
Det system som inrättas genom det föreslagna anslutningsavtalet kan också 
sägas institutionalisera och ge incitament till en fortsatt tillämpning av den 
doktrin som fastställts i det välkända Bosphorus-målet, där det fastställdes 
att EU måste anses erbjuda ett skydd för grundläggande rättigheter 
likvärdigt det som Europakonventionen ger. Även om Bosphorus-doktrinen 
inte bör godtas i sin nuvarande utformning, ter det sig lämpligt, kanske rent 
av nödvändigt, att, med hänsyn till unionsrättens särart, Europadomstolen i 
någon form fortsätter att visa EU-rätten den vördnad som Bosphorus-
doktrinen grundats på, åtminstone i de fall där EU agerat som ett överstatligt 
organ och är involverad i en process i egenskap av ”co-respondent”. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
With the entering into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009, following Article 
6(2) TEU, the European Union is under an obligation to accede to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
Annexed to the treaties is also Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union on the accession of the Union to the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
stating that the “agreement relating to the accession […] shall make 
provisions for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union 
law”.  
 
This has proven quite the task for the working group under the Steering 
committee for Human Rights that has been responsible of drafting the 
accession agreement. Most notably, the requirement to draft an agreement 
that respects the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law has 
forced the drafters to construct a rather complex legal framework, all while 
trying to balance and reconcile, as far as possible, Union interests with other 
important interests and principles of accession. 
 
While the work group finalized a draft accession agreement in April 2013, 
there is still a lot of work to be done before the EU may actually accede as a 
party to the Convention. First, the CJEU will need to give its opinion on 
draft agreement. Following that, a complete accession still requires not only 
a unanimous vote in the Council of Europe and a two-thirds majority in the 
European Parliament, but also ratification of the draft agreement by all the 
EU and Council of Europe Member States. A draft agreement that has 
compromised to much other important values in order to meet requirements 
of preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law might 
not be accepted further down the line.   
1.2 Aim and research questions 
The aim of this paper is to examine and analyse the draft agreement for the 
accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in light of the requirement that the 
accession agreement must make provisions for preserving the specific 
characteristics of the Union and Union law as required by Protocol (No 8), 
annexed to the treaties, relating to Article 6(2) TEU. In this part, the 
following are the main research questions set out to be answered: 
 
 What is meant by “the specific characteristics of the Union and 
Union law”? 
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 What is the purpose of accession and which are the interests that 
have guided the accession negotiations? 
 Which are the main issues of accession in light of Union specificity? 
 How has the need to preserve the specific characteristics of the 
Union and Union law affected other important interests and 
principles of accession? 
Seeing how the relationship between the ECtHR and the CJEU has been 
characterised by a certain degree of deference, based partially on the 
specific character of the Union legal system, another, related, aspect of 
accession is that of if and how it will alter the relationship between the two 
European Courts. In this part, the following are the main research questions 
set out to be answered: 
 
 How will accession affect the relation between the ECtHR and the 
CJEU?  
 How will accession affect the application of the doctrine of 
equivalent protection? 
 How will the accession agreement affect the future application of the 
doctrine of equivalent protection? 
1.3 Method and materials 
The method used in this paper is partly that of a traditional legal dogmatic 
approach and partly that of a more problem oriented method. The parts that 
describes, de lege lata, fundamental rights within the EU legal order, EU 
autonomy and the application of the doctrine of equivalent protection within 
the European Court of Human Rights, builds primarily on the Treaties of the 
European Union, case-law and opinions from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, case-law from the European Court of Human Rights and 
peer reviewed articles and publications by legal scholars. 
 
Next to these more descriptive parts are the discussions that, in light of the 
premises set by the normative basis, concern certain problem areas 
identified during the accession process, relating to accommodating the 
Union within the framework of the ECHR and adapting the Convention 
system to “fit in” a non-state, federal-like, international legal entity next to 
its own Member States. For this part, and the discussions on which 
ramifications this might have for reaching the goals and purposes of 
accession, this paper draws primarily from peer reviewed articles and 
publications by legal scholars, official documents from the Council of 
Europe and official documents from the institutions of the European Union. 
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To take in a practical perspective representing the interests of individual 
applicants seeking to avail their rights before the ECtHR, submissions by 
European national human rights institutions and non-governmental 
organizations to the informal working group established under the Steering 
Committee for Human Rights responsible with the task of drafting the 
accession agreement, have also been used. 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
The prospect of the European Union’s accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights has come with several complex issues, both 
legal and political. The most prominent issues discussed in legal doctrine 
and in the process of drafting an accession agreement may be divided into 
three separate categories; 1) Institutional issues – relating to the Unions 
participation in the institutional and administrative framework of the ECHR; 
2) Substantive issues – relating to the scope of accession as well as issues of 
competence and jurisdiction of the two European Courts; and 3) Procedural 
issues – relating to procedural mechanisms needed to accommodate a 
special legal entity such as the European Union within the framework of the 
Convention side by side with its Member States.
1
  
The focus of this paper are the issues related to accession caused by the 
specificity of the Union and the need to respect it as an autonomous legal 
order. For that reason, this paper will not go into any of the institutional 
issues, nor any issues relating to the scope of accession - i.e. which 
protocols to the Convention the Union should ratify once it accedes.  
In particular, this paper will look to three specific issues that have been 
especially contentious during accession discussions, i.e.; the creation of a 
co-respondent mechanism; the issue of involving the Court of Justice prior 
to any proceedings before the ECtHR in which there is a question regarding 
the interpretation or validity of EU law; and if and how the well-established 
doctrine of equivalent protection and how the relationship between the two 
European courts may be altered following accession. 
It should be added that while it is clear that the autonomy of the Union legal 
order is a fundamental aspect of Union specificity, the exact definition of 
autonomy within the context of EU law is not entirely certain.
2
 The full 
understanding of EU autonomy is not the focus of this paper, but rather its 
role as a precondition for Union accession to the ECHR and its implications 
in that context.  
 
                                                 
1
 For an overview and legal assessment, see Groussot, Xavier, Lock, Tobias and Pech, 
Laurant, “EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights: a Legal 
Assessment of the Draft Accession Agreement of 14
th
 October 2011”, Fondation Robert 
Schuman Policy Paper, European Issue no. 218, 2011. 
2
 van Rossem, Jan Willem, “The Autonomy of EU Law: More is Less?”, in Wessel, R. A. 
and Blockmans, S. (eds.), Between Autonomy and Dependence, 2013, Springer, p. 14. 
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1.5 Disposition  
The paper contains two separate chapters, each divided into several sub-
chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the process leading up to accession and is divided into 
four sub-chapters. First, it looks to the history and development of 
fundamental rights within the European Union leading up to accession 
(Chapter 2.1). Second, the purpose of accession is examined (Chapter 2.2). 
Third, a brief summary of the negotiation process is given (Chapter 2.3). 
Forth, focus is put on the premises of accession, i.e. the leading principles 
that has been guiding the accession negotiation process and requirements to 
Union autonomy (Chapter 2.4).  
 
Chapter 3 describes some of the main issues with accommodating the Union 
within the framework of the convention, how these issues have been solved 
in the draft accession agreement, and what are the main problematic with 
the solutions presented in the finalized draft accession agreement. The 
chapter is divided into three sub-chapters. First, focus is put on the problem 
of correctly addressing applications before the ECtHR to the Member States 
and to the Union respectively and the suggested solution, i.e. the co-
respondent mechanism (Chapter 3.1). Second, the issue of involving the 
CJEU prior to any proceedings before the ECtHR in which the EU will act 
as respondent or co-respondent will be discussed (Chapter 3.2). Third, the 
paper will look to what effect accession may have on the relationship 
between the ECtHR and the CJEU, especially how it will affect the 
application of the doctrine of equivalent protection (Chapter 3.3). 
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2 The road to accession 
2.1 The evolution of fundamental 
rights within the EU 
The possibility of accession of the EU to the ECHR has been subject to 
discussion since the late 1970s.
3
 At the time, while by no means a foreign 
concept, the matter of fundamental rights protection within the sphere of 
Community law was still in its infancy. Somewhat of a pioneer, it was the 
Court of Justice that, about ten years earlier, had started to incorporate and 
develop a Union conception of human rights through famous rulings such as 
Stauder
4
, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,
5
 Nold 
6
, Rutili
7
 and Hauer
8
.  
The real catalyst for this developing human rights doctrine within the 
European Union, which had started as a co-operation based mainly on 
economic interests, was however the unwillingness of national 
constitutional courts to accept the supremacy of a legal system which did 
not have in place the proper safeguards protecting fundamental rights. In the 
famous Solange I
9
decision by the German Constitutional Court, the German 
Court held that, as long as there was no Community fundamental rights 
catalogue equivalent to that guaranteed by the German Constitution, the 
German Constitutional Court would reserve the right to review the 
compatibility of Union law with the German Constitution. For the Union to 
maintain the recently developed doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of 
Community law, it was thus rather clear that a system of judicial review of 
violations of fundamental rights was necessary.
10
 
While the evolution of fundamental rights protection within the Union 
primarily may have had the CJEU in the driver seat with a progressive legal 
incorporation of fundamental rights in the shape of general principles of 
Union law, these judicial advancements was followed and subsequently 
strengthened by a legislative protection of fundamental rights.
11
  
From a legislative point of view, the developments of human rights 
protection within the Union following the Solange I decision saw 
                                                 
3
 CDDH(2011)009, Report to the Committee of Ministers on the elaboration of legal 
instruments for the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
4
 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419. 
5
 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125. 
6
 Case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491. 
7
 Case 36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219. 
8
 Case 44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727. 
9
 Decision of 29 May 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271. 
10
 Skouris, Vassilios  “Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: The Challenge of 
Striking a Delicate Balance”,  European Business Law Review, Vol. 17, 2006, pp. 225–239 
11
 Jacque, Jean Paul, “The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, 
2011. 
, p. 999f. 
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discussions on whether the Community should develop its own catalogue of 
fundamental rights; if it should accede to the ECHR; and whether the two 
options were mutually exclusive.
12
 While a unilateral approach was 
dominant in the years following the Solange I decision,
13
 the Commission 
made its first, unsuccessful, proposal that the Community should adhere to 
the ECHR in 1979.
14
  Following the Court of Justice Opinion 2/94
15
 it stood 
clear that even if there would have been a political will to accede, the lack of 
a legal basis in the Treaties meant that the Community did not have the 
competence needed to do so.
16
 
Without the unanimity required to amend the Treaties, focus was put on the 
creation of a Community bill of rights, i.e. the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (‘the CFEU’).17 With the entering into force 
of the Lisbon treaty, the Charter was elevated to primary law status coupled 
with the obligation of the Union to accede to the ECHR in Article 6(2) TEU. 
However, accession cannot be made unconditionally. Annexed to the treaty 
was also Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European 
Union on the accession of the Union to the European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
18
 stating that the 
“agreement relating to the accession […] shall make provisions for 
preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law”.  
To summarize, the link between the EU fundamental rights protection and 
the ECHR jurisprudence has always, ever since fundamental rights became 
a question for the Union, been growing stronger. The evolving relationship 
between the European courts is reflected both in Union legislation as well as 
the growing number of judgments given by the CJEU in which it refers not 
only to the provisions of the ECHR but also individual judgments of the 
ECtHR. Even if the preference of the judges of the Luxembourg court, as 
seen in Opinion 2/94, might have been an existence separated from the 
ECtHR, the CJEU has always acted in a co-operative manner – trying to 
                                                 
12
 Jacque, Jean Paul, “The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, 
2011, p. 999. 
13
 Jacque, Jean Paul, “The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, 
2011, p. 999. 
14
 Schermers, Henry G., “The European Communities Bound by Fundamental Human 
Rights”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 27, 1990, p 256; Accession of the 
Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights, Commission Memorandum, 
Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/79, COM (79) final. 
15
 Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759 
16
 Giorgio, Gaja, “Accession to the ECHR”, in Biondi et. al. EU law after Lisbon, 2012, 
Oxford University Press, pp. 180-194, p. 180  
17
 Anderson Q.C., David and C. Murphy, Cian, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
History and Prospects in Post-Lisbon Europe”, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2011/08, 2011, 
p. 1ff. 
18
 Protocol (No 8), annexed to the TEU and TFEU, relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union on the accession of the Union to the European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2010, O.J. C83/273. 
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create “a legal reality resembled to what it would be like if the EU were a 
party to the ECHR”.19 
The role of the Convention in this legal regime of “informal accession” is 
manifold. Since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, with the 
elevation of the CFEU to become legally binding with the same value as the 
EU Treaties, the Convention presents itself significant in several aspects of 
the Unions now multi-layered approach to fundamental rights.
20
 Like the 
Ghosts of Christmas past, present and yet to come, Article 6(1), 6(2) and 
6(3) TEU obliges the Union not only to look to general principles of the 
Union as its sole source of fundamental rights, but moves it into an era 
where the “dynamic” general principles have to coexist with the codified 
rights and principles of the CFEU as well as the prospect and obligation of 
ECHR accession and the following submission to an external fundamental 
rights review mechanism, to which it will be bound not only as a matter of 
internal Union  law, but also one of international law.  
2.2 The promises of accession 
Seeing how the Union has come such a long way with regard to the 
protection of fundamental rights, a reasonable question is, what it is that 
makes Union accession to the ECHR such a desirable endeavour? The 
protection of fundamental rights within the European Union already holds a 
high standard;
21
 all of the EU Member States are already signatories to the 
ECHR; and the CFEU has been elevated to primary law status. Considering 
the complexities related to accommodating the Union within the ECHR 
framework, there must be some reasons making accession worth the trouble. 
In fact, several reasons may be presented for the Union to accede to the 
Convention, albeit some stronger than others. The arguments may 
essentially be split into two categories; arguments of substantial nature, 
relating to the de facto expansion of human rights protection an accession 
would entail, and arguments of a more political nature, relating to the 
positive effects accession would have in a wider, more political sense, 
where results may not be as tangible but would still further human rights 
and European integration in a long term perspective. The European 
Parliament has identified the main arguments for accession as follows
22
: 
                                                 
19
 de Witte, Bruno, “The use of the ECHR and Convention case law by the European Court 
of Justice”, in Popelier, P., Van de Heyning, C. and Van Nuffel, P. (eds.), Human Rights 
Protection in the European Legal Order: The Interaction between the European and the 
national courts, 2011, Intersentia, p. 18. 
20
 Weis, Wolfgang, “Human Rights in the EU: Rethinking the Role of the European 
Convention on Human Rights After Lisbon”, European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 7, 
2011, p. 64f. 
21
 To such a degree that the ECtHR har recognized fundamental rights protection within the 
Union as equivalent to that of the ECHR. See Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret 
Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, 30 June 2005. 
22
 CDDH-UE(2010)03, European Parliament resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional 
aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, p. 3. 
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First, accession would represent an advancement of the European 
integration process and be a “further step towards political Union”.  
Second, it is argued that accession would increase the legitimacy and 
credibility of the Union. This would address any accusations of double 
standards of fundamental right protection when it comes to EU calling upon 
third countries
23
 or demanding of its Member States to respect the ECHR 
while not standing under any external control mechanism itself.
 
Similarly, 
accession would increase legitimacy in terms of addressing any criticism 
(seen against the backdrop of for example Solange I) that fundamental rights 
protection within the EU is a means for the preservation of Union 
supremacy and autonomy, rather than an end in itself.
24
  
Third, accession would represent a step towards a more coherent human 
rights regime within the whole of Europe. While Article 52(3) of the CFEU 
states that  
“In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of these rights shall be the 
same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection”  
it must not be forgotten that at the very core of the Union, there is a 
predominant idea of free movement and internal market integration. 
Accordingly, even if the stated means of interpretation of EU fundamental 
rights and principles is that to mirror, where applicable, those of the ECHR, 
the very nature of the Union presupposes a greater emphasis on economic 
rights and liberties when interpreting fundamental rights.
25
 An example of 
this mind-set could be seen in the CJEU’s “willingness to equate 
fundamental market freedoms in the EU treaty, such as the free movement of 
goods and services, with fundamental rights”.26 Although the relationship 
between the CJEU and the ECtHR has been characterised by an increasing 
amount of mutual respect and informal co-operation, there are areas of 
fundamental rights protection where the case law of the two European 
Courts, at times, have diverged (primarily regarding the right to respect for 
private life under Article 8 ECHR and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 
ECHR).
27
 Thus, through the establishment of an external control mechanism 
of Union compliance with fundamental rights, accession will hopefully 
                                                 
23
 CDDH-UE(2010)03, European Parliament resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional 
aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, p. 3. 
24
 Douglas-Scott, Sionaidh, “The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of 
Lisbon”, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 11, Issue 4, 2011, p. 649 and p. 676ff. 
25
 Oliver, Peter, “Case C-279/09, DEB v. Germany Judgment of the European Court of 
Justice (Second Chamber) of December 2010”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, 
2011, p. 2028. 
26
 Douglas-Scott, Sionaidh, “The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of 
Lisbon”, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 11, Issue 4, 2011, p. 676. 
27Scheeck, Laurent, “The Relationship between the European Courts and Integration 
through Human Rights”, Heidelberg Journal of International Law, Vol. 65, 2005, p. 854f; 
Douglas-Scott, Sionaidh, “The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of 
Lisbon”, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 11, Issue 4, 2011, p. 658f 
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serve as a mean to ensure greater coherence and protection of fundamental 
rights within in Europe.  
Fourth, beyond coherence, and maybe most importantly, accession of the 
Union to the ECHR would close a gap in fundamental rights protection 
through bringing within the direct scope of the ECHR the acts of the 
institutions of the European Union. At present, infringements that can only 
be attributed to actions of the Union, and not to an act by any Member State, 
are immune to ECtHR review.
28
 This was for example the situation in the 
case Connolly
29
, where a former employee of the European Commission 
tried to bring a case against all the (then) EU Member States before the 
ECtHR. Connolly had in proceedings before the CJEU, been denied to 
submit written observations to the opinion of the Advocate General. Feeling 
that he had been deprived of his procedural rights, Connolly turned to the 
ECtHR. However, since the EU was not a party to the Convention, Connolly 
had no option other than to direct his claim towards the EU Member States. 
The ECtHR found, that since the allegation could not be attributed to any 
kind of domestic act, none of the Member States could be held 
responsible.
30
 Since the EU Member States were the only possible 
respondents, Connolly had no case before the ECtHR. While these types of 
cases might not be common, it is still a lacuna in European fundamental 
rights protection. As European “unionisation” and the competences of the 
Union increases, it will be all the more important that citizens can avail their 
right to fundamental rights protection not only against the Member States, 
but also against the Union itself. As such, Union accession will likely be a 
big step for human rights protection within Europe.  
2.3 The process of accession 
The road to accession of the Union to the ECHR has been long and paved 
with both political and legal obstacles. The task of integrating the two 
different legal orders has in the end seemingly proved to be less than 
impossible and many steps have been taken on the lingering path of 
accommodating the EU under the wings of the Convention. One of the 
biggest hurdles to accession was cleared through the entering into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty; the European Union now not only have the competence 
to accede to the Convention but also an obligation to do so.
31
 On part of the 
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Convention, the entering into force of Protocol no. 14 to the ECHR 1
st
 of 
June 2010 ,
32
 has made accession possible both legally and structurally.
33
  
However, while the foundation and framework for accession is set, the task 
of drafting an accession agreement fully compatible with the two European 
legal orders has been a matter of great complexity – adaptation has proved a 
difficult task, both from a legislative and a political point of view. From 
June 2010 until October 2011, the CDDH-UE
34
, an informal working group  
established under the Steering Committee for Human Rights responsible 
with the task of drafting “a legal instrument [...] setting out the modalities of 
accession”,  held in total eight meetings with the European Commission 
encompassing also exchanges of views with representatives of civil society. 
During these meetings, the working group identified and discussed the 
several outstanding issues that have to be addressed to make accession 
possible. Many of these issues have likely meant a lot of headache for the 
drafters – not only must the draft agreement meet political demands, but the 
solutions to the issues must be held within the confinements set up by the 
Lisbon Treaty on the one hand, and the ECHR on the other.
35
 On 14
th
 
October, 2011, the CDDH-UE presented their final draft accession 
agreement with explanatory report. At that point, the Steering Committee 
for Human Rights considered that given the political implications of some 
of the remaining issues, it had done all it could at that stage and left the 
agreement in the hands of Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe.
36
 
On 13 June 2012, the Committee of Ministers instructed the CDDH to 
pursue negotiations with the European Union, in an ad hoc group “47+1”, 
with a view to finalizing without delay the accession instruments.
37
 After 
four meetings spread over the course of approximately a full year, that ad 
hoc group, on 5 April 2013, presented what is to be considered the finalized 
draft accession agreement. Now, the CJEU will be asked to give its opinion 
on the texts compatibility with the EU treaties.
38
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Assuming that the Luxembourg court finds the finalised draft agreement 
compatible with the treaties, the mandatory procedure prescribed by Article 
218 TFEU regarding the conclusion of international agreements with third 
countries or international organisations must be followed. While the 
finalised draft agreement indeed represents a “milestone” in the accession 
negotiations, a complete accession still requires not only a unanimous vote 
in the Council of Europe and a two-thirds majority in the European 
Parliament, but also ratification of the draft agreement by all the EU and 
Council of Europe Member States.
39
  
2.4 The premises of accession 
In order to understand some of the choices made by the drafting groups, it is 
thus crucial to be aware of the political and legal constraints under which 
the agreement has been drafted and the associated interests whom the 
drafting group have had to respect, balance and, sometimes, compromise. Of 
course, with so many parties involved in the accession negotiations, there is 
bound to be an abundance of diverging interests at play. Additionally, 
although somewhat criticised for the lack of transparency and involvement 
of “civil society’s participation” in the drafting procedure, it is clear from 
the correspondence between the drafting group and several NGO’s that the 
drafting group have put some effort into getting a diversity of opinion and 
that they have considered the views of stakeholders that have human rights 
as their primary interest during the drafting of the accession agreement.
40
  
However, there are a few overarching principles that have been particularly 
important for the work of the drafters. These principles have served as 
guidelines during the drafting process and all have likely had an influence 
on what is the final draft agreement presented in the beginning of April 
2013. 
2.4.1 Principles relating to the interests of 
the individual 
The first group of principles important to accession are those relating to the 
interests of the individual. Reconnecting to the rationale of Union accession 
to the ECHR, it was noted early on in the working process of the CDDH-UE 
that a guiding principle of drafting the accession agreement must be that the 
Unions accession should be to the benefit of the rights of individuals and 
their right of access to justice.
41
 In its resolution of 19 May 2010, the 
European Parliament noted the importance of finding adequate answers and 
solutions to the main technical questions of accession “in order to enable the 
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EU’s accession to the ECHR to be used for the benefit of citizens”.42 
Accordingly, important principles, such as the principle of equality of the 
parties in proceedings, the need to preserve the applicant’s procedural 
position and rights, and the need to avoid a complicated or cumbersome 
mechanism which would slow down proceedings were all acknowledged as 
guiding principles by the CDDH-UE for the purpose of drafting the 
accession agreement.
43
 Indeed, for an individual applicant, the benefits of a 
complete and coherent European fundamental rights regime could easily be 
lost somewhere along the tracks of a long and cumbersome procedure.  
2.4.2 Principles relating to the integrity of the 
ECHR 
The second group of principles are those relating to the integrity of the 
ECHR system. First, and most importantly, there is the need to, as far as 
possible, preserve the system of the convention, even though the EU is a 
non-state party acceding to a legal instrument created for states. As put in 
the words of the European Parliament “[It is] important, in the interests of 
those in both the Union and third countries who are seeking justice, to give 
preference to accession arrangements that will have the least impact on the 
workload of the European Court of Human Rights.”44 The ever increasing 
caseload of the ECtHR has long been a problem in Strasbourg and even if 
measures are being taken to remedy the ECtHR backlog, the Strasbourg 
Court still have a long way to go.
45
 
A second important principle is that of preserving the equality of the parties 
to the convention.
46
 However, not only is the EU a non-state party, it is also 
a sui generis international organization with a federal like structure of which 
all its 27 Member States are already signatories to the ECtHR. As such, 
issues of equality are inevitable and extend to several aspects of accession; 
EU participation and voting rights within the Committee of Ministers; the 
adaptation of certain procedural mechanisms to accommodate the specificity 
of the EU judicial structure within the framework of the convention; and, in 
light of the current relationship between the EU and the ECHR, the actual 
standard of fundamental rights protection to which the ECtHR will hold the 
different contracting parties responsible. A system of fundamental rights 
protection where the signatory states are not equal to each other would 
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ultimately lose its legitimacy. Thus the equality of the parties has been one 
of the pivotal points during accession discussions. 
The third principle relating to the ECHR is the need to respect the Court’s 
responsibility to ensure the good administration of justice in the cases before 
it, i.e. that the ECtHR remains as master of the proceedings.
47
 
2.4.3 The autonomy of the Union legal order 
The last type of “principle” relates to the interests of the EU and is not as 
much a guiding principle as it is an absolute and fundamental aspect of the 
European Union legal order.
48
 Disregarding any political aspects, the 
dominantly biggest hurdle to accession has been the requirements to draft an 
agreement that will let the Union accede to the ECHR without adversely 
affecting the autonomy of the Union legal order. The effects of any 
adaptations made specifically to accommodate the Union under the 
Convention system may represent a detriment to the other important 
principles of accession and fundamental rights protection. The constraints 
set up by Union autonomy in relation to international agreements concluded 
by the Union has thus made accession to the ECHR a difficult balancing act 
where several interests have to be weighed against each other.  
However, while it is clear that the preservation of Union autonomy is a 
precondition for accession, the complexity of the accession process has not 
been reduced by the fact that it is not entirely clear what the exact definition 
of autonomy is within the context of EU law.
49
 While the full understanding 
of EU autonomy is outside the scope of this paper, it is nevertheless 
necessary to have a brief look at the concept and how it affects EUs 
international commitments to be able to fully understand and discuss the 
choices made by the drafters of the accession agreement.  
2.4.3.1 Internal autonomy 
The concept of autonomy of the European Union was first addressed by the 
Court of Justice in the landmark case of Costa v ENEL
50
 as a result of a 
structural development ranging back a few years earlier.
51
 In their ruling, the 
CJEU established that the law of the treaties was an independent source of 
law that “could not […] be overridden by domestic legal provisions […] 
without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the 
legal basis of the Community itself being called into question.”52  
The main rationale behind the concept of Union autonomy is the importance 
of uniform interpretation of EU law throughout the whole Union. Different 
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interpretations of EU law within different Member States would undermine 
the rights guaranteed by the Union legal order and rob it of its Union 
character.
53
 As such, the autonomy of the Union legal order is a concept of 
fundamental significance for the very nature of the EU
54
 and arguably, it is 
the most essential characteristic of the Union body of law.
55
  
Since Costa v ENEL, the Court of Justice have had several opportunities to 
elaborate on the concept and while the early understandings of Union 
autonomy were mostly focused on the relationship between the Union and 
its Member States, for example as a basis for primacy and direct effect of 
Union law, the concept does encompass several external aspects reflecting 
the relationship between the EU legal order and international law.
56
 As 
expressed by Haberstam and Stein, the “internal dimension of European 
constitutionalism is only half to promise of an autonomous legal order”.57  
 
2.4.3.2 External Autonomy 
The external dimension of autonomy has, quite naturally, developed 
primarily through the opinions of the CJEU on international agreements. 
Through the Opinions of the Court of Justice relating to previous draft 
agreements envisaged or entered by the Union, the CJEU has made clear 
that any such agreements must not violate Union autonomy
58
, and set out 
the constraints to which any international agreement entered by the Union 
must abide. In particular, the CJEU has made clear that international law 
must not impinge upon the unique judicial structure of the Union.
59
 Thus, 
also with regards to external autonomy the rationale of unity can be seen 
through the CJEUs concern to “remain in control of the interpretation and 
application of EU norms”.60  
Thus, in order to understand the meaning of external Union autonomy one 
has to look at the opinions of the CJEU in relation to the international 
agreements previously entered or envisaged by the Union where the external 
autonomy of the Union has been an issue. It was in Opinion 1/91 on the 
draft agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA)
61
 that these issues 
were first addressed by the CJEU. It has since been confirmed and re-
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established by the Court in several following Opinions on international 
agreements concluded or envisaged by the Union, most recently in its 
Opinion 1/09 on the draft agreement for a Union patent court.
62
 For the sake 
of Union accession to the ECHR, three points are especially crucial. 
First, while an international agreement may establish a system of courts to 
which the Union will be submitted, those courts must not be allowed to 
decide on the distribution of competences between the Union and its 
Member States. Such a system is likely adversely affect the allocation of 
responsibilities defined in the Treaties and, hence, the autonomy of the 
Union legal order. This was one of the reasons why the first envisaged EEA 
agreement was deemed incompatible with the EU Treaties. The draft EEA 
agreement envisaged the setup of an EEA court which would have 
jurisdiction in disputes between the “Contracting Parties” of the EEA 
agreement. The crux, however, was that the expression “Contracting Party”, 
as defined in the agreement, could have several different meanings, 
depending on the case brought before the Court. In a dispute, it was 
therefore not unlikely that the Court could be called upon to interpret the 
expression “Contracting Party” within the meaning of the EEA agreement. 
To be able to do so, the Court would have had to examine and rule on the 
distribution of competences between the Community and its Member States. 
Thus, the envisaged agreement was incompatible with Community law.
63
 
Second, the CJEU must not be robbed of its exclusive right to interpret 
Union law. This means that an international agreement “must not have the 
effect of binding the Community and its institutions, in the exercise of their 
internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of Community law 
referred to in that agreement.”64 This was again the case in the first draft of 
the envisaged EEA agreement. The EEA court would have had jurisdiction 
to interpret the EEA agreement, whose provisions were drafted identically 
or in close resemblance of their counterparts in the EEC Treaty. In order to 
interpret the agreement, the EEA court would thus be required to interpret 
the corresponding provisions in the EEC Treaty. Coupled with the fact that 
the EEA court, in their interpretation of the provisions, would only be bound 
by the rulings given by the CJEU prior to the date of signature of the 
agreement and not those after, this would encroach upon the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret EU law in a way incompatible with the 
Treaty.
65
 
Lastly, as a third condition of external autonomy, “an international 
agreement must not alter the essential character of the powers which the 
Treaties confer on the institutions of the Union and on the Member States 
and which are indispensible to the preservation of the very nature of the 
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European Union.” 66  Any such transfer of powers must follow the Treaty 
amendment procedure set out in Article 48 TEU. This includes, but is not 
limited to, divesting the decisions of the CJEU of their binding nature.
67
 In 
Opinion 1/91, this was the third reason of the Court of Justice for declaring 
the envisaged EEA agreement incompatible with the Treaty. The envisaged 
agreement set up a system where the courts and tribunals in the EFTA 
States, under certain circumstances, would be able to ask questions and 
make references to the Court of Justice. However, the answer of the CJEU 
would be purely advisory. According to the Court, “such a situation would 
change the nature of the function of the Court of Justice as it is conceived by 
the EEC Treaty, namely that of a court whose judgments are binding”.68 
 
2.4.3.3 Autonomy codified 
The constraints set by Union autonomy on accession are not only found in 
the previous opinions of the CJEU. The case law of the court is reflected in 
the treaty provisions regulating the accession and thereto related protocols. 
Although autonomy is not explicitly mentioned in said provisions, their 
meaning is clearly that the terms of Union accession to the ECHR must be 
drafted to preserve Union autonomy.
 69
 
Article 6(2) TEU stipulates that “The Union shall accede to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the 
Treaties.”  
Article 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 8 relating to Article 6(2) TEU further 
clarifies the meaning of the Article.
70
 According to the Protocol, the 
accession agreement must not only ”make provisions for preserving the 
specific characteristics of the Union and Union law”, but also “ensure that 
accession of the Union shall not affect the competences of the Union or the 
powers of its institutions”. 
Furthermore, Article 3 of Protocol No. 8 states that “Nothing in the 
agreement referred to in Article 1 shall affect Article 344 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union,” which in turn provides that 
“Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement 
other than those provided therein.” 
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The scope of Article 6(2) and the relating Protocol is somewhat unclear 
since it fails to explain the meaning of “the specific characteristics of the 
Union and Union law”. The provisions must however be read in light of the 
opinions given by the CJEU in relation to international agreements 
previously entered or envisaged by the Union.
71
 Some guidance as to how 
the Protocol should be interpreted was also given by Court of Justice in its 
Discussion document on certain aspects of accession released 5 May 2010.
72
 
In the document, with Protocol No. 8 as a basis, the court put emphasis on 
the need to preserve the special characteristics of the Union’s system of 
judicial protection, an aspect fundamental to union autonomy.
73
 This would, 
according to the Court, at least require the institution of “a mechanism [...] 
which is capable of ensuring that the question of the validity of a Union act 
can be brought effectively before the Court of Justice before the European 
Court of Human Rights rules on the compatibility of that act with the 
Convention.”. As will be seen infra, the prior involvement of the CJEU in 
proceedings before the ECtHR is indeed one of the focal points of the draft 
accession agreement. 
2.4.4 Striking a balance  
Making the Union subject to an external review mechanism will raise issues 
of Union autonomy whether one likes it or not. In fact, it seems that 
autonomy is not only the cause to many of the issues related to accession, 
but sometimes also the very restraint to their solution. The issues related to 
Union autonomy may be both procedural in nature as well as legal 
substantial. Accordingly, the implications the accession of the Union to the 
Convention will have on Union autonomy has been scrutinized to no end 
during the process of drafting the accession agreement and discussed 
thoroughly in legal doctrine. The drafters have been extraordinarily 
responsive to the “feedback”74 from the European courts for the purposes of 
finding a solution that does not conflict with the Treaties
75
 while at the same 
trying to meet the demands of non-EU countries and to respect as far as 
possible the guiding principles of accession. At stake is accession under the 
Treaties as they stand. Should the Court of Justice in its opinion, following 
the procedure set out in Article 218(11) TFEU,
76
 decide to declare the draft 
agreement incompatible with Union law, the Union may be forced to amend 
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the Treaties before concluding any agreement on accession.
77
 In such case, 
it is unlikely that Member States would stop at negotiating amendments to 
facilitate accession, and the floodgates would be opened for Member States 
to renegotiate the Treaties as a whole.
78
  
At the same time, a draft accession agreement accepted by the Court of 
Justice is by no means the end of the line. As the accession agreement has to 
be ratified individually by all the 47 parties to the ECHR, a draft agreement 
that has compromised other important values might not be accepted further 
down the line.  
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3 Issues related to Union 
autonomy and accession 
There are several issues connected to the accession of the EU to the ECHR 
of which the most prominent may be divided into three separate categories; 
institutional issues – relating to the Unions participation in the institutional 
and administrative framework of the ECHR; substantive issues – relating to 
the scope of accession as well as issues of competence and jurisdiction of 
the two European Courts; and procedural issues – relating to procedural 
mechanisms needed to accommodate a special legal entity such as the 
European Union within the framework of the Convention side by side with 
its Member States.
79
 The focus of this paper are the issues related to 
accession caused by the need to respect the Union as an autonomous legal 
order and will not go into any of the institutional issues, nor any issues 
relating to the scope of accession - i.e. which protocols to the Convention 
the Union should ratify once it accedes. This chapter will focus on three 
issues that have been particularly contentious during accession discussion. 
First, it will look to the institution of a co-respondent mechanism. Second, it 
will look to the issue of involving the Court of Justice prior to any 
proceedings before the ECtHR in which there is a question regarding the 
interpretation or validity of EU law. Third, it will look to the well-
established doctrine of equivalent protection and how the relationship 
between the two European courts may be altered following accession. 
3.1 The correct addressing of 
applications to Member States and the 
Union 
The accession of the Union to the ECHR poses a rather specific situation. 
As an instrument originally designed only for states, the Convention does 
not possess the proper mechanisms needed to harbour a non-state 
autonomous legal entity such as the Union, side by side with its Member 
States.
 80
 Due to the federal-like structure of the Union and how Union law 
is implemented into the legal orders of the Member States, situations might 
arise where it is not clear whether it is only the acting Member State that 
should be held responsible for a specific violation under the Convention or 
if responsibility should comprise the Union as well.
81
 Where there is no 
                                                 
79
 For an overview and legal assessment, see Groussot, Xavier, Lock, Tobias and Pech, 
Laurant, “EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights: a Legal 
Assessment of the Draft Accession Agreement of 14
th
 October 2011”, Fondation Robert 
Schuman Policy Paper, European Issue no. 218, 2011. 
80
 47+1(2013)008rev2, Final report to the CDDH, Appendix V, para. 38. 
81
 Groussot, Xavier, Lock, Tobias and Pech, Laurant, “EU Accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights: a Legal Assessment of the Draft Accession Agreement of 
  25 
discretion for the Member State to implement Union law, it has merely 
acted as an executive body, and responsibility should be shared with the 
Union (the legislative body). Similarly, it is ultimately the Member States 
that agrees upon and enacts the provisions of the EU treaties on which basis 
the EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies act.
82
 This special structure 
of the Union clearly has some implications on accession and as a 
consequence the need has been recognized for a mechanism that ensures 
that applications to the ECHR ”are correctly addressed to Member States 
and/or the Union as appropriate”. 83 
The need of such a mechanism also presents itself with regard to the 
difficulty for an individual applicant to determine from which legal order 
the alleged violation of the Convention stems, and in turn the effects such 
difficulties could potentially have for an individual in terms of admissibility 
of a case. Take for example a case where a national authority has acted 
against an individual based on the provisions of an EU regulation. The 
individual applicant is in such situation likely to address her complaint only 
to the Member State, even if the national authorities had no discretion in 
applying the EU regulation. Should this affect the admissibility of the case? 
If so, the ECtHR would likely, in their assessment of the applicant’s choice 
of defendant, have to decide on the distribution of competences between the 
Union and its Member States to be able to rule on admissibility. Not only 
would such arrangement, similarly to the jurisdiction provision in the first 
envisaged EEA agreement
84
, amount to an infringement of the autonomy of 
Union law, but it would be devastating for the individual applicant who 
would not have their case tried.
85
 
The following section will first describe the drafting groups presented 
solution to these problems, the so called co-respondent mechanism. 
Secondly, it will look to some of the benefits of the mechanism. Lastly, it 
will discuss some of the critique directed against the mechanism. 
3.1.1 The co-respondent mechanism 
During the discussions on accession, perhaps as an indication of the 
complexity of the matter, there were several different suggestions on how a 
mechanism that would ensure that applications to the ECHR are correctly 
addressed to Member States and/or the Union as appropriate could be set up. 
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Some of the discussed solutions involved, for example, that the Union and 
the Member States would draw up a declaration of competence that would 
inform individual applicants and non-Member States of the division of 
responsibilities within the Union.
86
 It could also be solved through the 
establishment of a preliminary reference procedure between the ECtHR and 
the CJEU, where the Strasbourg court would turn to its colleagues in 
Luxembourg to delineate the distribution of competences between the Union 
and its Member States.
87
 However, many of these proposals had flaws in 
that they either would have been too complex and/or burdensome for the 
individual applicant, or that they were likely to conflict with Union 
autonomy as defined by the CJEU in their opinions on international 
agreements.
88
  
In the end, the drafters of the accession agreement found the middle road in 
the co-respondent mechanism, which would let the Union or the Member 
States join proceedings as co-respondents respectively where the other party 
was subject to an allegation under the Convention.
89
 Article 3 of the 
accession agreement stipulates that the following paragraph shall be added 
at the end of Article 36 ECHR. 
“The European Union or a member State of the European Union may 
become a co-respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the 
circumstances set out in the Agreement on the Accession of the European 
Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case. The 
admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the 
participation of a co-respondent in the proceedings.” 
The mechanism is envisaged to trigger in two different scenarios. For the 
European Union in the case of an application directed against one or more 
EU Member States: 
“the European Union may become a co-respondent to the proceedings in 
respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that such 
allegation calls into question the compatibility with the Convention rights 
at issue of a provision of European Union law, including decisions taken 
under the TEU and under the TFEU, notably where that violation could 
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have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under European 
Union law.” 90 
Conversely, if there is an application directed against the European Union, 
the Member States may become co-respondents to the proceedings  
“Where an application is directed against the European Union, the Union 
Member States may become co-respondents to the proceedings in respect 
of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that such 
allegation calls into question the compatibility with the Convention rights 
at issue of a provision of the TEU, the TFEU or any other provision having 
the same legal value pursuant to those instruments, notably where that 
violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under 
those instruments.” 91 
The mechanism is triggered only at the request of a High Contracting Party 
and by decision of the Court. Simply put, a High Contracting Party (the 
Union or the Member States) may make a reasoned request to join the 
proceedings as co-respondent in a case notified by the Court. The Court then 
makes a decision in light of the reasons given by the High Contracting Party 
concerned. If it is “plausible” that the specific conditions for triggering the 
mechanism are met, the High Contracting Party will join as co-respondents. 
As stated by the new paragraph, a party that joins proceedings as co-
respondent becomes full party to the case. The co-respondent is thus not 
only allowed the limited participation in proceedings of a third party 
intervener (regulated under Article 36(2) ECHR), but will have all rights 
and obligations of an original respondent, such as the right to defense and 
the obligation to execute a judgment given by the ECtHR.
92
  
 
3.1.1.1 The benefits of the co-respondent 
mechanism 
The co-respondent mechanism solves some of the issues resulting from the 
unique structure of the European Union judicial system. First, while it is 
almost certainly impossible to fully remove all the complexities that the 
special structure of the Union judicial system imposes within the framework 
of the Convention system, the co-respondent mechanism removes from the 
applicant the burden of determining the distribution of competences 
between the Member States and the Union. Additionally, coupled with the 
mechanism for the prior involvement of the CJEU to any proceedings before 
the ECtHR in which the EU will act as respondent or co-respondent (see 
infra), the co-respondent mechanism allows for a system where the 
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applicant only needs to exhausts the domestic remedies of one of the legal 
orders in order to fulfil the criteria of Article 35 ECHR.
93
 
Second, the mechanism addresses the issue of holding a Member State or 
the Union responsible for a violation for which it has no legislative power to 
remedy. According to Article 3 paragraph 7 of the draft agreement: 
“If the violation in respect of which a High Contracting Party is a co-
respondent to the proceedings is established, the respondent and the co-
respondents shall be jointly responsible for that violation, unless the Court, 
on the basis of the reasons given by the respondent and the co-respondent, 
and having sought the views of the applicant, decides that only one of them 
be held responsible.” 
Thus, in cases where the co-respondent mechanism is applied, the applicant 
is assured that the correct party is held responsible in case of a violation.
94
   
From a Union point of view, by removing from the ECtHR  the task of 
interpreting, as well as any possibility to make decisions on, the distribution 
of competences between the Union and the Member States, the mechanism 
also is a means of respecting Union autonomy.  
 
3.1.1.2 Criticism against the co-respondent 
mechanism 
The co-respondent system has not gone without criticism. Just like many of 
its alternatives, the co-respondent mechanism too has been criticised based 
on its complexity. Furthermore, it has been pointed out in legal doctrine that 
there is a risk of an abuse of procedure or that the mechanism leads to the 
creation of an unfavourable position of the applicant.  
3.1.1.2.1 A binding or voluntary mechanism? 
One of the big discussion points with regard to the co-respondent 
mechanism during the drafting process has regarded its voluntary nature.
95
 
Up until the final draft of the accession agreement, there was no clause or 
document to force or guarantee that either the EU or a Member State would 
join proceedings where the criteria for the mechanism would be fulfilled. 
Some commentators, as well as fourteen of the non-EU state parties to the 
convention
96
, found this rather unfortunate as a voluntary based co-
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respondent mechanism could be said to run counter to the very purpose of 
its creation which was “to avoid gaps in the participation, accountability 
and enforceability in the Convention system”.97 Not only would it put in the 
hands of the potential “perpetrator” the choice of her own “prosecution”, but 
the fact that a potential co-respondent has an option whether or not to join 
proceedings next to the original respondent could also lead to a situation 
where, even though a claim is successful, the judgment cannot be fully 
enforced since the (lone) main respondent would not have the competence 
to bring the violation to an end. 
98
 
In a study carried out by the CDDH in 2002 on technical and legal issues of 
the EU accession to the ECHR, the study group considered that “it would 
probably be difficult to give the Court the power to oblige the EC/EU to join 
a case as co-defendant, for this might be seen as prejudging questions 
relating to the respective responsibilities of the Contracting Parties or in 
effect render inoperative certain admissibility criteria of the EC/EU”.99 The 
reasons for making the co-respondent mechanism voluntary could also be 
based on an underlying fear of violating Union autonomy. If the EU could 
be bindingly obliged to join as co-respondent, based on an interpretation 
made by a body other than the Court of Justice on the distribution of 
competences between the Union and its Member States, the mechanism, 
similarly to the jurisdictional clause in the first envisaged EEA Agreement, 
would be incompatible with the treaties.  
While there is no clause in the final draft agreement itself, a declaration by 
the European Union to be made at the time of signature of the Accession 
Agreement has been drafted in Appendix II to the final draft agreement. To 
reconcile the conflicting interests of a) not prejudging any questions of 
responsibility; b) avoiding gaps in the participation, accountability and 
enforceability in the Convention system; and c) remaining respectful of 
Union autonomy; the draft declaration states that:  
“Upon its accession to the Convention, the European Union will ensure 
that[…] it will request to become a co-respondent to the proceedings 
before the European Court of Human Rights or accept an invitation by the 
Court to that effect, where the conditions set out in Article 3, paragraph 2, 
of the Accession Agreement are met”100 
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Thus, there will be a declaration by the Union to voluntarily agree to 
become a co-respondent whenever possible and, as such, any issues of 
prejudgment should be eliminated. Furthermore, this nuance seem 
especially important from an Union autonomy point of view as the EU will 
not be compelled by an external body to join proceedings, but only do so out 
of its own will.  
Illustrative of the complexity (and perhaps sanctity) of Union autonomy 
may be the fact that some commentators ask themselves the question 
whether the co-respondent mechanism could still, even in its purely 
voluntary construction, gives the ECtHR too much of a discretion in 
determining whether a party may join as co-respondent to the initiated 
proceedings or not. The question is whether the construction where the 
ECtHR have the power to deny a High Contracting Party the right to join as 
co-respondent (likely a result of the principle that the ECtHR should remain 
master of the proceedings)
101
 does the job at preserving Union autonomy 
any better than a construction where it would have the power to oblige a 
party to join.
102
 On that note, Ritleng criticises the draft mechanism for its 
vague formulation which “leaves the Strasbourg Court a margin of 
discretion” to decide whether the EU or a Member State should be joined as 
co-respondent or not, and instead suggests that a solution similar to the one 
provided in Article 6 of Annex IX to the UNCLOS (which regulates the 
distribution of responsibility and liability under the Convention between 
State Parties and international organizations based on a declaration of 
distribution of competences) would have been a more suitable approach.
103
  
With regard to the interest of avoiding gaps in participation, accountability 
and enforceability in the Convention system, these aspects still seems 
somewhat compromised as this “soft” solution could still leave some leeway 
to the EU in terms of participation, for example through their own 
interpretation of whether the conditions set out in Article 3, paragraph 2 of 
the Accession Agreement are met or not. Additionally, as pointed out by 
Lock, it is interesting that “the Member States do not appear to have 
undertaken a similar obligation in the reverse case where the EU is the 
main respondent.”, something that may be appropriate for the Member 
States to do in order to meet the requirements of Protocol No. 8.
104
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Arguably, there may be some benefits to this “kvasi-voluntary” construction 
of the co-respondent mechanism, other than to keep it within the boundaries 
of Union autonomy and avoiding issues of prejudgment. Since the 
mechanism could impose a considerable procedural burden on applicants 
and Contracting Parties, particularly if the CJEU has not yet ruled on the 
compatibility with the Convention of the relevant provisions of EU law, it is 
important that the mechanism is not triggered unnecessarily.
105
 Indeed, in 
many cases, the most appropriate way to involve the EU in proceedings will 
be through its intervention as a third party.
106
 Even though the drafters of 
the accession agreement expect that the co-respondent mechanism may be 
applied only in a limited number of cases,
107
 one of the benefits that come 
with the presented solution would be that it potentially could help to prevent 
any inappropriate and excessive use of the mechanism, since the EU and the 
Member States respectively is likely themselves in the best position to 
determine whether or not it is necessary to join as co-respondent or if it 
simply suffices to intervene as third party.  
3.1.1.2.2 Inadequacy in relation to violations through 
omissions? 
Another point of critique directed against the co-respondent mechanism is 
that it arguably falls short when it comes to addressing violations that arise 
through failures to legislate, or so called omissions. Beyond the obligation 
under the ECHR that the State Parties must not interfere with human rights, 
the Convention contains a number of positive obligations, which in essence 
requires national authorities to adopt reasonable and suitable measures to 
safeguard the rights of individuals.
108
 Looking to the EU and its Member 
States, the difficulty to distinguish who of the parties must be held 
responsible in the case of an omission becomes perhaps even more 
problematic than in the case of a “pure” interference. Where there is no act 
or legislation behind a violation of the Convention, an assessment of the 
division of competences between the EU and the Member States is the only 
possible way to determine the distribution of responsibility. The key 
question becomes: “Who had the competence, and thus responsibility, to 
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act?” A question that, if investigated and answered by the ECtHR, likely 
would violate the autonomy of the Union legal order.
109
  
Lock distinguishes two scenarios, in which an applicant may allege a 
violation of Convention rights by omission,  
(1) A scenario where a provision of EU law mandates action by a 
Member State but the Member State has failed to act. 
 
In such case, the co-respondent mechanism would not trigger, since the 
provision of EU law would not be contrary to the Convention. The 
application would be directed at the responsible Member State for its failure 
to comply. This scenario should not pose a problem as the interpretation of 
EU law would be unnecessary.  
(2) A scenario where no legal provision exists, neither at EU level nor at 
Member State level. 
 
The real problematic scenario arises where legal provisions exist in neither 
of the EU or national legal orders. The co-respondent mechanism could not 
be triggered since there would be no relevant provision of EU law at all. A 
literal reading of the final draft of the co-respondent mechanism would thus 
render the mechanism inapplicable, even where the division of competences 
between the Member States and the EU is not clear-cut. Thus, it could be 
argued that the draft agreement does not satisfy the requirement in Article 1 
of Protocol 8 to the Lisbon Treaty, since it does not entirely ensure that 
applications under the Convention are addressed to the correct entity.
110
 
3.1.1.2.3 Assigning responsibility between respondents 
Another issue relating to the co-respondent mechanism is the tension 
between Union autonomy and the need for the ECtHR to assign 
responsibility to one or both of the respondents where a violation has been 
found. The problem is not explicitly inherent in the co-respondent 
mechanism itself, but rather stems from the notion that responsibility should 
be attributed based on the distribution of competences. However, since any 
external assessments of competence distribution between the Union and the 
Member States are carefully avoided with regard to the application of the 
co-respondent mechanism, the problem resurfaces when the time comes for 
the ECtHR to decide on the issue of attributing responsibility - a problem 
that might not be present within a system where the issue were solved in the 
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stage of determining the appropriate respondent through, for example, a 
declaration of competences or a reference procedure where the CJEU 
decides on the delineation of competences.
111
  
In order to address the issue, the drafters of the accession agreement have 
envisaged a system of joint responsibility as the general rule, “unless the 
Court, on basis of the reasons given by the respondent and the co-
respondent, and having sought the views of the applicant, decides that only 
one of them be held responsible.”112. In this regard, the European Group of 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) have expressed a view that the 
apportionment of liability in co-respondent cases is important, particularly 
in relation to just satisfaction and that a clear apportionment would better 
enable the NHRIs to assist in domestic implementation of judgments.
113
 
And while the system of joint responsibility prescribed in Article 3, 
paragraph 7 of the draft accession agreement ensures that the correct party, 
capable of removing the violation, will always be held responsible, it also 
creates a situation where the final decision of the ECtHR must be followed 
by an internal EU procedure where it is decided how responsibility 
ultimately shall be distributed between the Union and the Member States in 
each case.  
Additionally, fourteen of the non-EU Member States that are signatories to 
the Convention have also directed sharp critique at this solution. They 
consider the fact that the ECtHR would not by itself be authorized to hold 
only one party responsible if there is no joint request by the parties to be 
inconsistent with the ECHR system.
114
  
 
3.2 The prior involvement of the Court 
of Justice 
Another contentious issue related to the accession has been the necessity of 
ensuring the involvement of Court of Justice prior to any proceedings before 
the ECtHR in which the EU will act as respondent or co-respondent. The 
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issue reflects both concerns of the autonomy of the Union legal order and 
the subsidiary nature of the ECtHR.  
Simply put, because of the specificity of the Union judicial system, which 
encompasses both the national courts of the Member States as well as the 
CJEU, there is a risk that a case might come before the ECtHR where the 
Luxembourg court have not yet made a ruling on the interpretation of the 
Union laws that are allegedly in conflict with the Convention. 
First, it should be mentioned that the issue of involving the CJEU should 
almost always be solved by default. In most cases, the Court of Justice will 
naturally be involved through the applicant’s obligation to exhaust domestic 
remedies. Basically, actions of EU law can be divided into two categories. 
First, there is the “direct action” which is brought immediately before the 
Union courts. This would for example be the case where an individual is 
seeking to challenge the validity of a Union measure that is of direct 
concern to that individual, following the provision set out in Article 263(4) 
TFEU. The second category of action is the “indirect action” where a 
question of interpretation or validity of Union law has been raised before a 
national court. In such cases, national courts have a far-reaching obligation 
to request preliminary rulings from the CJEU on questions of interpretation 
and validity of EU law, following the case law of Foto-Frost
115
 and the so 
called CILFIT-criteria.
116
 Accordingly, as expressed by the presidents of the 
two European courts, the situation that the ECtHR would be called upon to 
rule on an alleged violation without the prior involvement of the CJEU 
“should not arise often”.117 The problem only really arises in the situation 
of; a) an indirect action where a national court, for whatever reason, 
declines to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU in a case where a 
question of the compatibility of a national measure derived from Union law 
with any of the Convention rights are concerned;
118
 or b) when the validity 
of an act lies outside the scope of CJEU jurisdiction and cannot be 
challenged under the Treaties.
119
 
It has been argued by some commentators that, because the ECtHR would 
only have the jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EU acts with the 
Convention, and not to interpret them in an internally binding manner, there 
would be no issues concerning EU autonomy even in cases where the CJEU 
were not previously involved, meaning that the procedure for the prior 
involvement of the CJEU is unnecessary.
 120
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The final draft agreement does not state any other reason for implementing 
the new mechanism than the principle of ECtHR subsidiarity.
121
 Indeed, for 
purposes of autonomy, there would not be much difference between a 
construction where the ECtHR may be called upon to rule on the 
compatibility of an act of the Union with the Convention without any prior 
involvement of the CJEU, and one where the ECtHR may decide to declare 
an act of the Union incompatible with the Convention contrary to a prior 
ruling by the CJEU. After all, it is the EU that accedes to the Convention 
and not the other way around; CJEU judgments will not be binding upon the 
ECtHR.
122
  
But if Union autonomy were not an issue, it is curious why the CJEU so 
explicitly would state the opposite. In its Discussion document of 5 May 
2010, with a reasoning based on autonomy coupled with the subsidiary 
nature of the Convention, the CJEU stated that the ECtHR must not be 
called on to decide on the conformity of an act of the Union with the 
Convention without the prior involvement of the Court of Justice. With 
reference to how the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU to declare acts of 
the Union invalid “is in integral part of the competence of the Court of 
Justice”, the CJEU suggested that any other solution would be prone to 
affect the ‘powers’ of the institutions of the Union in a way contrary to 
Protocol No 8 to Article 6(2) TEU.
123
 The “preservation of the monopoly of 
the Court of Justice of the EU in the interpretation of EU law” was also 
stressed in a press release by the Council of the European Union as an 
objective of the forthcoming accession negotiations.
124
 
Maybe, the real fear, as suggested by Jacqué, is that the ECtHR could end 
up in a situation where they would have to interpret a provision of Union 
law to at all be able to determine its compliance with the Convention.
125
 
Here, the connection to the subsidiary nature of the ECHR seems all the 
more natural. The principle of subsidiarity is firmly established in the legal 
system of the ECHR and the Strasboug court is not “a Court of fourth 
instance” that “will substitute itself for national authorities when it comes to 
interpreting acts of national law or a treaty”.126 With the arrangement of 
the judicial system of the Union, where the Court of Justice alone has 
jurisdiction in questions of application and interpretation of Union law,
127
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ensuring the prior involvement of the CJEU becomes an issue of both 
subsidiarity and effectiveness. It is not really a question of “involving the 
Court of Justice as the supreme court of the European Union” but the only 
way “proceedings can be brought in order to carry out an internal review 
before the external [ECtHR] review takes place”.128 As often reiterated by 
the ECtHR,“the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention is laid on the national 
authorities. The machinery of complaint to the Court is thus subsidiary to 
national systems safeguarding human rights”. 129  
3.2.1 Criticism against the prior involvement 
of the CJEU  
Accepting that there is a need for a procedure ensuring the prior 
involvement of the CJEU, there initially were concerns on how such 
mechanism may be structured. The final draft agreement with explanatory 
report does not address the issue entirely but is content by suggesting that an 
internal EU procedure be put in place which would let the CJEU review “the 
compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of the provision of EU law 
which has triggered the participation of the EU as a co-respondent”.130 But 
even if there are still a lot of question marks on how the final product of the 
mechanism for the prior involvement of the CJEU will look, there are still 
some interesting points to make with regard to how the mechanism will 
affect the procedural position and rights of an individual applicant.  
 
3.2.1.1 Length of procedures 
The envisaged procedure for involving the CJEU has been one of the most 
contentious points of the draft accession agreement in the civil society 
organisation opinions submitted to the CDDH during the drafting process. 
The main concern expressed during discussions in relation to the prior 
involvement of the Court of Justice is related to the length of procedure 
before the ECtHR.
131
 Justice delayed is sometimes justice denied and 
neither the CJEU nor the ECtHR are exactly known for their speedy 
judgments. If a case must go through the systems of both courts, it is not 
very likely that justice will come at greater speed. In 2011, the average 
duration of proceedings before the CJEU in references for preliminary 
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rulings was 16.4 months.
132
  On part of the ECtHR, the impact of an ever-
increasing caseload has long been a problem in Strasbourg. Although 
measures are being taken to remedy the ECtHR backlog, the Strasbourg 
Court still have a long way to go.
133
   
Considering that the procedure in the cases where the Court of Justice will 
need to be involved will be even further prolonged through the introduction 
of a co-respondent mechanism,
134
  these problems might be very real for the 
few applicants that end up in these situations. The nightmare scenario of 
course being a case where the Court of Justice has already been involved in 
the course of national proceedings but did not, for whatever reason, rule on 
EU law compatibility with the particular Convention rights at stake on that 
occasion, ultimately requiring a second involvement of the Luxembourg 
court.
135
 Whether this scenario is real or purely academic remains to be 
seen, but the CJEU has at times been criticised for its eclectic use of 
references to the ECtHR or its shallow examination of those rights once 
they have been brought up. For example, the Luxembourg court have been 
known to refuse to deal with a question of Convention rights violation by 
the EU institutions if they are not raised by the parties and therefore 
considered ultra petita. On other occasions, the Court has even gone so far 
as to disregard such arguments even were they were put forward by the 
parties, based on the fact that the case could be decided on different 
grounds. It should be noted however, that the CJEU occasionally has 
decided to bring up questions of fundamental rights even where a party, or 
in cases of preliminary rulings, a national court has failed to do so.
136
 
To address the issue of complex and time-consuming proceedings, the 
drafters of the accession agreement has envisaged the use of a procedure 
similar to the existing PPU procedure used before the CJEU.
137
 The 
proposal has generally been welcomed as a positive addition to the draft 
agreement.
138
 In contrast to regular references for preliminary rulings before 
the CJEU, the PPU cases had an annual average duration of between 2 - 2.5 
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months since its introduction in 2008.
139
 But is justice in haste just as bad as 
justice delayed? In case of the rather successful PPU procedure, such 
argument has generally been rejected. However, as expressed by Barnard in 
relation to that procedure: “if the Court becomes so inundated with cases 
under the PPU that it is unable to give each one the attention it deserves”, 
that view might change.
140
 Likely, the amount of cases that will trigger the 
mechanism for the prior involvement of the CJEU and the new accelerated 
procedure will not be very many.
141
 However, the integrity of the existing 
PPU procedure, and the effects of adding to that caseload, should 
nonetheless still be of concern, and the drafters of the agreement should plan 
accordingly.
142
 
 
3.2.1.2 Procedural burden for the applicant 
Even if proceedings before the CJEU may be held short through an 
accelerated procedure, the prior involvement of the Court of Justice could 
still represent a considerable burden for the individual applicant, financially, 
legally and procedurally.
143
 The draft explanatory report to the draft 
agreement does provide that applicants “will be given the possibility to 
obtain legal aid” for the purpose of submitting their observations to the 
CJEU, but is not more specific as for the conditions such legal aid would be 
given.
144
  
The NHRIs are also conscious about their own right to submit observations 
in proceedings before the CJEU.
145
 The draft explanatory report seems to 
exclude such possibility as it envisages a procedure that will only allow “the 
parties involved” to make observations before the CJEU146 while “the 
parties and any third party interveners” will have the opportunity to assess 
the consequences of the Court of Justices ruling before proceedings are 
resumed at the ECtHR.
147
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3.2.1.3 The effect of CJEU judgments  
Another issue worth noting is what the actual effect of CJEU rulings given 
under the envisaged procedure for prior involvement will have, beyond 
providing the proper interpretation of the EU law at stake. Some aspects of 
the procedure are made clear in the final draft explanatory report, but a few 
dimensions remain unknown. What is made clear in the draft explanatory 
report is, first, that the CJEU will only assess the legal basis for the act or 
omission complained of by the applicant, and not the merits of the case;
148
 
second, that the Court of Justice’s assessments will not bind the ECtHR. 
(otherwise, the whole purpose of an external control mechanism would be 
for naught);
149
 and third, that the ECHR will resume its examination of the 
merits of the application after “the parties and third party interveners have 
had an opportunity to assess properly the consequences of the ruling of the 
CJEU”.150  
Even if the contours of the mechanism are established in the draft agreement 
and the explanatory report, there are still a few questions that are not 
entirely answered by the draft. Disregarding the question of how the 
mechanism will work from a procedural technical point of view (something 
that will have to be worked out internally by the EU
151
) the question remain 
what the actual effect of the CJEU rulings will be in the proceedings 
pending before the Strasbourg court. Similarly, it may not be entirely clear 
what effect the rulings will have internally for the EU institutions and the 
Member States.
152
 
When the mechanism for involving the CJEU is triggered, there will be two 
possible outcomes of the CJEU assessment. Either the Luxembourg court 
will find that the Union act is in conformity with convention rights in which 
case the act will remain valid under EU law; or, it will find to the contrary, 
that the act is in violation of fundamental rights and declare the act invalid.  
First, in cases where the CJEU finds that the act is in conformity with the 
Convention rights, the effect should not be very different to that of a ruling 
by any national court. While the rulings will not be binding on the 
Strasbourg Court, the prior involvement of the CJEU gives the ECtHR the 
possibility to show an amount of deference by taking into consideration the 
Luxembourg Courts ruling and its reasoning for reaching that particular 
ruling.
153
   
In their communications with the CDDH-UE, the NHRI have expressed 
some reservation in this regard. The NHRI’s fear that following the process 
of involving the CJEU, “the two Courts could potentially show excessive 
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deference to one another [...] which could be to the detriment of the 
applicants.”154 While the submission is related to an earlier draft version 
from February 25 2011, which states more explicitly that the proceedings 
before the CJEU should be taken into account by the procedure of the 
ECtHR
155
, the concerns are still valid considering the current relationship 
between the two European courts. The mechanism could be said to 
somewhat institutionalise the relationship of trust established through the 
Bosphorus doctrine and the procedure would indeed place the EU in a 
favoured position with regards to other contracting parties of the 
Convention, whose constitutional courts does not hold the same privilege.
156
  
As expressed by Eckes, it is not unlikely that the opinion of the CJEU will 
set the framework of the following legal discussions in Strasbourg “as 
parties will be invited to submit their observations after the Court of Justice 
has given its opinion on the case and will most likely follow in their 
arguments the Court’s approach.”.157 
Fourteen of the non-EU Member States that are signatories to the 
Convention expressed in January 2013 as a major concern that “the impact 
on the Strasbourg Court of the assessment made by the Luxemburg Court 
should not be underestimated” and that such procedure would indeed 
constitute a privilege for one Contracting Party, indicating that the issue is 
rather a shortcoming of the EU judicial system than a matter requiring an 
adaptation of the Convention system. They continued to note that “the issue 
needs further consideration and should be seen in the wider context of 
derogations from the principle of equal footing”.158 
However, short of removing the procedure for prior involvement, it is not 
likely that much can be done at the drafting stage to address the issue, and it 
will ultimately be in the hands of the judges of the ECtHR to decide the 
amount of deference suitable to show towards their colleagues in 
Luxembourg. 
Legally, the issue might be more complicated in cases where the CJEU 
instead finds that the Union act is not in conformity with the Convention 
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rights at stake and declares the Union act invalid. Although it might not be 
entirely clear what legal effects such ruling will have internally within the 
Union legal order,  following Opinions 1/91 and 1/00 of the Court of 
Justice, the Luxembourg Courts rulings will likely have to remain internally 
binding.
159
 As such, any implementing action relating to the invalidated act 
will retroactively be rendered illegal.
160
 The question is then how this 
should affect whether the applicant would still be considered a victim within 
the meaning of the Convention or whether the proceedings before the 
ECtHR should be drawn to a close.
161
 However, while the CJEU ruling may 
invalidate a general measure violating the Convention, the individual may 
still be subject to an enforceable national court decision that are now res 
judicata. As such, the status of the applicant would depend on the course of 
action taken by the national authorities following the CJEU ruling. If the 
national authorities do not officially remove the violation, the applicant will 
remain a victim.
162
 It remains to be seen how this situation will be handled. 
3.3 The doctrine of equivalent 
protection 
One of the major topics relating to European human rights has long been the 
legitimacy of the silent cooperation and mutual respect shown between the 
ECtHR and the CJEU. In relation to accession, the question is if and, if so, 
how this relationship will be altered post accession. Specifically, one of the 
most contentious issues is whether the doctrine of equivalent protection 
established between the ECHR and the EU through the famous 
Bosphorus
163
  decision would be at all reasonable to maintain following 
accession. As one of the main objectives of accession is the creation of a 
more coherent, and thus strengthened, fundamental rights regime in Europe, 
an external control mechanism that remains too respectful of its subject 
could render the benefits of accession illusory. This section will first, in 
brief, turn to the history and development of the relationship of mutual 
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respect established between the two European courts. Second, it will look to 
the well-established doctrine of equivalent protection and its current 
application. Third, and finally, it will look to the expected effects of 
accession on the relationship between the two courts and the problematic 
question of application or non-application of the doctrine of equivalent 
protection post accession.  
3.3.1 Development of the doctrine of 
equivalent protection  
As mentioned earlier, the evolution of the EU is that of a pure economic 
integration project without any competences in the human rights area, to 
that of a full blown political union where human rights is a fundamental 
aspect relevant to any Union action. Accordingly, the relationship between 
the Union and the Convention, whom had started out as two international 
entities with entirely different objectives, became all the more intricate as 
the competences of the Union institutions progressively treaded into areas of 
human rights law. Through the gradual transfer of powers from the national 
authorities of the Member States to the Union institutions, the lacunae in 
human rights protection within Europe became increasingly apparent as the 
EU, who were not a signatory to the Convention, could not be held 
responsible before the ECtHR.
164
 
The “solution” found by the ECtHR (then the European Commission for 
Human Rights) to address the issue, in 1958, was to hold EU Member States 
responsible for violations made by the Union.
165
 Although hardly effective, 
the approach showed that the Strasbourg Courts would not just stand by as 
the EU Member States, through their transferal of powers to the Union, 
committed to obligations that would hinder them from performing their 
obligations under the Convention.
166
 
Pursuant to the developments within the EU human rights regime in the 
following years, with particular note of the model of “deference in 
sovereignty” constructed by the German Constitutional Court in their 
Solange II
167
 judgment from 1986, the ECtHR adopted a more cautious 
approach “opening the way for a mutual understanding between the 
Strasbourg Court and the EU human rights regime.”168 through their 
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judgment in the M. & Co. case
169
, delivered in 1990. Similar to the approach 
taken by the German Constitutional Court, the Strasbourg Court held that: 
“The transfer of powers to an international organization is not 
incompatible with the Convention provided that within that 
organization fundamental rights will receive an equivalent 
protection. […] The Commission notes that the legal system of the 
European Communities not only secures fundamental rights but also 
provides for control of their observance.”170 
With the M. & Co. case, the Strasbourg court thus laid down the foundation 
for the line of case law that eventually resulted in the doctrine of equivalent 
protection.
171
 
Two important aspects may be distinguished with regard to the notion of 
equivalent protection as constructed by the Strasbourg court in M. & Co and 
later reestablished in Waite & Kennedy
172
 and Beer & Regan
173
. First, the 
Court recognized that there was a normative basis through which the EU 
provided the protection of fundamental rights. Second, it noted that the 
normative basis was complemented by a system of control – the European 
Court of Justice – through which the observance of human rights was 
enforced.
174
 Thus, for the ECtHR to consider a legal order of fundamental 
rights protection equivalent to that of the ECHR, it is required that that legal 
order provides both substantive guarantees as to the observance of 
fundamental rights as well as judicial mechanisms that observe the 
application of the legal obligations derived from said rights. 
In 2005, through the landmark case Bosphorus, the Strasbourg court further 
clarified its approach to EU human rights and established the current 
relationship between the ECtHR and the European Court of Justice. 
 
3.3.2  Bosphorus: The current state of affairs 
In 1992, Bosphorus Airlines, a Turkish airline charter company, signed a 
lease agreement for two Boeing 737-300 aircraft with Yugoslav Airlines, 
the national airline of former Yugoslavia.
175
 In 1991, due to the armed 
conflict and human rights violations taking place in the Federal Republic of 
                                                 
169
 M. & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, European, App. No. 13258/87, 9 February 
1990. 
170
 M. & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, European, App. No. 13258/87, 9 February 
1990. 
171
 De Hert, Paul and Korenica, Fisnik, “The Doctrine of Equivalent Protection: Its Life and 
Legitimacy Before and After the European Union's Accession to the European Convention 
on Human Rights”, German Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 07, 2012, p. 880. 
172
 Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, 18 February 1999,  para. 64ff. 
173
 Beer & Regan v. Germany, App. No. 28934/95, 18 February 1999,  para. 54ff. 
174
 De Hert, Paul and Korenica, Fisnik, “The Doctrine of Equivalent Protection: Its Life and 
Legitimacy Before and After the European Union's Accession to the European Convention 
on Human Rights”, German Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 07, 2012, p. 880. 
175
 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, App. No. 
45036/98, 30 June 2005, para. 12. 
  44 
Yugoslavia at the time, the UN had adopted, and the European Community 
implemented, a series of sanctions against the country.
176
 When one of the 
leased Boeings landed in Dublin, the Irish Minister for Transport, following 
the obligations laid down in Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93, 
ordered the detainment of the leased aircraft and a denial of all service, 
including services that would enable it to fly.
177
 After unsuccessfully trying 
to reverse the decision of the Irish government in the domestic courts of 
Ireland, including a preliminary reference to the CJEU, the Turkish airline 
company made a complaint to the ECtHR claiming that Ireland had failed 
its obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention.
178
 In its 
response, the ECtHR held that, while the Convention does not, on the one 
hand, prohibit Contracting Parties from transferring sovereign powers to an 
international organisation, a State cannot, on the other hand, fully escape its 
responsibilities under the Convention by such a transfer.
179
 To reconcile 
these positions, the ECtHR went on to establish the famous Bosphorus-test; 
If a State has no more than implemented legal obligations flowing from its 
membership of an international organisation considered to provide 
protection equivalent to that of the Convention, there is a presumption that 
the State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention. 
However, that presumption is rebutted if, in the circumstances of a 
particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was 
manifestly deficient.
180
 In Bosphorus, after briefly concluding that the 
protection of fundamental rights under the European Community were 
equivalent to that for which the Convention provides,
181
 and that the 
protection of Convention rights, in the particular case of Bosphorus, could 
not be considered manifestly deficient,
182
 the ECtHR held that the Irish 
governments impoundment of the aircraft did not give rise to a violation of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
183
 
Thus, pre accession, the state of affairs with regards to the ECtHR – EU 
relationship may be summarized somewhat as follows. First, the Strasbourg 
court will examine applications that implicitly claim that a violation of the 
ECHR has its basis in EU law. Second, the Court has an established 
“standard to which the EU human rights regime is held to be equivalent to 
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its ECHR counterpart” 184. In line with M & CO. that standard requires both 
substantive guarantees as well as a system of control through which the 
observance of human rights is enforced. Third, as a consequence of the 
presumption of equivalence, not only are EU human rights law immunized 
from Strasbourg review, but also any act of a EU member state that “does 
no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership in 
the organizaton”185.186 These observations were indeed confirmed by the 
court in the more recent case Michaud v. France
187
, in which the ECtHR 
distinguished the case from Bosphorus for two reasons. First, in Michaud, 
which concerned the implementation of an EU directive, the state “had a 
margin of manoeuvre capable of obstructing the application of the 
presumption of equivalent protection”.188 Second, the court noted that the 
Conseil d’Etat had refused to “refer the question before it to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling, even though that court had never examined 
the Convention rights in issue” and thus “ruled without the full potential of 
the relevant international machinery for supervising fundamental rights”189. 
Accordingly, the application of the doctrine of equivalent protection does 
not extend ad infinitum. Only areas of EU law that can be reviewed by the 
EU judicial mechanism as to its conformity with the human rights standards 
are presumed equivalent. As confirmed by the Strasbourg court in 
Matthews
190
, the presumption of equivalence does not include EU primary 
law, i.e. the founding treaties of the Union, as those acts cannot be 
challenged before the European Court of Justice. EU primary law are not 
acts of the Union but rather international treaties entered freely by the 
Member States. It is also arguable, as applied in Bosphorus
191
 and more 
recently reiterated in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece
192
, that the application 
of the doctrine does not extend beyond the policy areas within the limits of 
what, before the entering into force of the Lisbon treaty, was considered as 
the “law of “first pillar” of the European Union”. 193  
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3.3.2.1 A controversial ruling 
It is clear that, in Bosphorus, the ECtHR showed a great degree of deference 
towards the CJEU.
194
 Generally, as partially seen through the case law of 
the Strasbourg court, the relationship between the two European courts has 
been characterized by such mutual respect, yet not without a certain degree 
of “mandate demarcation” from both courts.195 The Bosphorus decision was 
not an uncontroversial one and six of the seventeen ECtHR Judges in the 
case, while concurring with the findings of the majority, thought the amount 
of deference shown to the Union went too far, as it would let the Union 
apply a less stringent standard of protection. Additionally, it was argued that 
such degree of deference posed the risk of creating a double standard of 
review between High Contracting Parties that had acceded to international 
conventions and High Contracting Parties that had not.
196
  
3.3.3 Continued application of Bosphorus 
doctrine? 
The question now is if, post accession, this silent cooperation is still 
justifiable.
197
 If it should continue to apply, should it be extended to include 
all measures adopted by the Union? Indeed, what is the point of accession if 
the threshold when scrutinizing EU law is so high that those cases are 
virtually excluded from a review by the ECtHR? Even if cases would be 
admissible rationae parsonae, a continuation of the application of the 
doctrine of equivalent protection, of its current design or in a new form, 
could in practice leave EU measures materially protected from ECtHR 
review. Such approach would arguably eliminate some of the substantive 
reasons on which EU accession to the ECHR is based, and leave it as an 
endeavour based primarily on political and symbolic reasons.
198
  The draft 
accession agreement remains silent on the issue (although the issues related 
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to the prior involvement of the CJEU undeniably touches upon similar 
matters) and the opinions of commentators in legal doctrine are varied.
199
  
 
3.3.3.1 A difficult question 
While the most intuitive answer to the question whether the doctrine of 
equivalent protection should remain or not seem to be in the negative, 
Douglas Scott points out that any predictions are difficult.
 200
 The altered 
relationship between the two courts, where the ECtHR will always have the 
last word, arguably begs for a more thorough review
201
 and there should no 
longer be a need for the comity that has defined the relationship between the 
two European courts for so long. A continuation of the “special treatment” 
given with regard to EU law would strike a false note in relation to the other 
State Parties and the principle that all parties of the convention should be 
treated equally.
202
 In light of the considerable critique directed against the 
doctrine already in the era of pre accession, it would seem difficult to justify 
any continued application; yet even harder to extend its application to cases 
that directly concern the conduct of the EU rather than the actions of a state 
following its obligations under EU law. Such extension seems especially 
unmotivated considering that one of the main rationales behind the doctrine 
of equivalent protection is “the importance of international cooperation and 
of the consequent need to secure the proper functioning of international 
organizations”203 – an objection that should not be feasible with regard to 
“unilateral” EU actions.  
Yet, with regard to the EU, the doctrine of equivalent protection arguably 
holds an additional dimension; a concession to the unique character of the 
Union. If the Bosphorous doctrine is seen as a concession to the unique 
character of the Union and Union autonomy, the doctrine should remain 
intact as accession will not alter those premises.
204
 In fact, the “specific legal 
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order” of the EU is recognised in the preamble of the final draft accession 
agreement. A view that the doctrine of equivalent protection should remain 
would thus be based on arguments similar to those expressed by the 
European Commission in the Bosphorus proceedings: 
“[The doctrine of equivalent protection] was an approach which was 
especially important for the European Community given its distinctive 
features of supra-nationality and the nature of Community law: to require a 
State to review for Convention compliance an act of the European 
Community before implementing it (with the unilateral action and non-
observance of Community law would potentially entail) would pose an 
incalculable threat to the very foundations of the Community, a result not 
envisaged by the drafters of the Convention, supportive as they were of 
European cooperation and integration.”205 
The argument goes that if the doctrine of equivalent protection were to be 
dismissed, it would potentially challenge the direct effect and primacy of 
EU law and its supranational characteristics.
206
 
 
3.3.3.2 Implicit effects of the accession agreement? 
As somewhat of a dark prophesy for the fears expressed by the NHRI:s 
during drafting negotiation that, following the process of prior involvement, 
“the two Courts could potentially show excessive deference to one another 
[...] which could be to the detriment of the applicants.”207, and also as a 
confirmation of the critique expressed by the fourteen non-EU Member 
States with regard to the process of prior involvement,
208
 De Hert and 
Korenica argues that, within the framework of the draft accession 
agreement, “it is logical the Strasbourg Court will continue to uphold the 
Doctrine substantively even after the accession”.209 One of the reasons being 
that the co-respondent mechanism, coupled with the process of prior 
involvement, lends itself to putting the Union in a privileged position as to 
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making a “better pitch in convincing the Starbourg Court that its law and 
mechanisms offer equivalent protection to those of the ECHR”.210  
Similarly, Eckes points out that the prior involvement mechanism could be 
said to somewhat institutionalise the relationship of trust established through 
the Bosphorus doctrine,
211
 but still is of the belief that the doctrine should be 
dropped as a “general presumption [of equivalent protection] cannot be 
applied to a particular opinion that the Court of Justice has given under the 
prior involvement procedure”. The Strasbourg court can no longer hide 
behind general considerations and can only find the specific opinions of the 
CJEU to be either correct or incorrect.
212
  
 
3.3.3.3 Is there still a need for deference?  
Another aspect that perhaps should be considered is the recent developments 
on the internal EU application and interpretation of the CFEU, in particular 
the Luxembourg courts understanding of the “homogeneity clause”213, 
Article 52(3) of the Charter, which regulates the scope and interpretation of 
Charter rights that correspond to rights also guaranteed by ECHR. One of 
the central questions being – does the Charter impose an obligation for the 
CJEU to strictly follow Strasbourg case-law when interpreting 
“corresponding rights”? Through its rulings in the Grand Chamber cases 
Åkerberg
214
, in part related to the interpretation of the ne bis in idem 
principle, and Melloni
215
, in part related to the interpretation of the standard 
of protection on judgments in absentia, the CJEU has arguably taken a 
rather strict approach to the interpretation of Article 52(3) CFEU. Most 
notably, the Luxemburg court in both cases neglect to make any reference to 
Article 52(3) CFEU and in Åkerberg, contrary to the well elaborated 
Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón
216
, declined to make any reference to ECtHR 
case law at all, despite the obvious correspondence between Article 50 
CFEU and Article 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR. Thus, it could be argued that the 
CJEU has developed an autonomous interpretation of the ne bis in idem 
principle that in many cases will diverge from that developed by the 
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ECHR
217
, In the light of Åkerberg and Melloni, it seems that the 
Luxembourg court has taken a minimalistic approach to Article 52(3) CFEU 
that reinforces the autonomous character of EU law towards the ECHR legal 
order, rather than creating coherence.
218
  
This view should however be nuanced by the fact that not all Member States 
have ratified Protocol 7 to the ECHR and as expressed by Groussot and 
Olsson, it seems “a distinction should be drawn between core 
corresponding rights (mandatory interpretation in light of the ECHR case-
law) and peripheral corresponding rights (independent interpretation from 
the ECHR case law)”.219 
In light of the Åkerberg, however, there may arguably still be reasons for the 
ECtHR to continue to afford the CJEU the comity shown in years past, as 
the Luxembourg Court has indicated that it is prepared to give EU 
fundamental rights a meaning independent from the case law of the ECtHR 
even where Charter and Convention rights correspond. Should the 
Luxembourg court refuse to give full effect to a ECtHR decision where it 
considers that the Strasbourg court does not give proper respect to the 
constitutional identity of the Union, that would – contrary to the very 
purpose of accession – certainly call into question the coherence of the 
protection of fundamental rights within Europe.
220
 
 
3.3.3.4 A remodeling of the doctrine? 
While the Bosphorus doctrine may no longer be an option in its current 
shape and form
221
, that does not preclude that the ECtHR will find other 
ways to approach the Union and the specifity of its legal system.   
While the continued application of the Bosphorus doctrine in any form 
would, as mentioned earlier, arguably stand in conflict with the principle of 
equality of the Contracting States to the ECHR, it must be remembered that 
– in line with the old Aristotlelian principle that “equals should be treated 
equally and unequals unequally” – due respect should be given to the 
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Unions special status as a non-state actor. This could offer some 
justification for the special treatment of the Union next to the other 
Contracting Parties – the EU should only be treated equally to the other 
Contracting Parties as long their situations are comparable. Thus, with 
regard to applications where the EU is involved as a supranational 
organization – a situation that would be distinguished from a case where the 
application directly concerns the actions of the EU institutions – i.e. where it 
has acted as the legislative body rather than the executive one (and where 
the EU would be involved as a co-respondent), a treatment different to that 
of other Contracting Parties could arguably be justified and perhaps even 
necessary.  
It is however argued that the level of deference shown by the ECtHR with 
regard the Union legal order should not remain at the same level as that 
shown through the Bosphorus-doctrine and the presumption of equivalent 
protection. To give such carte blanche to the Union fundamental rights 
protection system when the Union has acceded to the Convention seems 
both unjustified and would indeed run counter to the purpose of accession as 
the only difference between the Bosphorus type of cases pre- and post-
accession would be a longer and more cumbersome procedures for an 
individual applicant but with equally poor chances of a successful claim. An 
example of a more appropriate approach would be, as suggested by Ritleng, 
for the ECtHRto afford the EU a certain margin of appreciation when 
striking a fair balance between fundamental rights and the general interests 
of the EU.
222
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4 Conclusion 
While the finalization of the draft accession agreement in April 2013 was 
indeed a milestone in the accession process, there is still a lot of work to be 
done before the EU actually accedes as a party to the Convention. First, the 
CJEU will be asked to give its opinion on this international agreement to be 
concluded between the Union and other parties. Following that, a complete 
accession still requires not only a unanimous vote in the Council of Europe 
and a two-thirds majority in the European Parliament, but also ratification of 
the draft agreement by all the EU and Council of Europe Member States.
223
 
A number of internal rules and procedures to the EU also have to be 
adopted, such as the procedure for the prior involvement of the CJEU and a 
procedure to determine who of the EU and the Member States that will 
ultimately have to pay where they have been found jointly liable.
224
 
Despite the considerable efforts by the drafting group to respect Union 
autonomy, it seems difficult to predict the outcome of the assessment the 
CJEU will make of the agreement in its forthcoming opinion. There is 
obviously room for doubts with regard to how some of the mechanisms in 
the draft agreement comply with the golden standard required to respect the 
Union autonomy that the Luxembourg court guards so vehemently. 
Especially with regard to the co-respondent mechanism, there are still 
question marks as to whether the solution stays within the boundaries of 
Union autonomy. For example, does merely giving to the ECtHR the 
possibility to decline the Union to join as a co-respondent where it seeks to 
do so infringe on the CJEU exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the distribution 
of competences between the Union and the Member States? It is hard, 
however, to imagine a less autonomy-intrusive mechanism that does not 
compromise, to such a degree that it will not work politically, either the 
interests of the ECtHR, the interests of the other non-EU state parties to the 
Convention and/or the interests of individuals seeking to avail their rights 
before the Strasbourg court. For example, solutions like that of a system of 
declaration of competence, similar to the one used under the UNCLOS, does 
not seem to lend itself practical where the subject of litigation concerns 
alleged fundamental rights infringements relating to individuals rather than 
conflicts between states. 
As for the political process and the remaining negotiations, it seems likely 
that we will not see a ratified accession agreement for some time 
considering the prolonged process of working out the now presented draft 
accession agreement. Especially the prior involvement mechanism and the 
presented system of joint liability still seem to be contentious. As late as 21 
January 2013, fourteen non-EU Member States to the Convention expressed 
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“major concerns” with regard to, among others, these two specific points - 
something that does not seem to have been entirely addressed in the final 
draft. These concerns are mainly founded on the guiding principles of 
accession: The adaptations of the ECHR system as a whole should be 
limited to what is strictly necessary for the purpose of accession; and that 
accession should, to the largest possible extent, be based on the principle of 
equal footing between the EU and the 47 high contracting parties. This 
seems to be at the pinnacle of accession problems, and perhaps the main 
reason why the accession process is taking such a long time: to reconcile 
these two fundamental interests - how equal may the footing be when Union 
autonomy has to be respected?  
On the other side of accession lies another aspect of the equality/autonomy 
dilemma - the question of the continued application of the doctrine of 
equivalent protection. While the future of the doctrine truly lies in the hands 
of the ECtHR rather than with the accession agreement, it could be argued 
that the finalised draft agreement sets a framework that institutionalises and 
incentivises a continuation of the doctrine of equivalent protection, or rather 
the deference and comity that permeates it, although perhaps in a less 
outspoken and less deferent shape and form. Such application seems most 
likely and perhaps even necessary in cases where the EU has acted as a 
supranational entity and is involved in proceedings as co-respondent. Recent 
case law of the CJEU indicates that the Luxembourg court is prepared to 
give EU fundamental rights a meaning independent from the case law of the 
ECtHR and to reinforce the autonomous character of EU law towards the 
ECHR legal order. 
 
On that note, another problematic aspect relating to the specific structure of 
the Union and its judicial system should be mentioned. It is evident that the 
proposed mechanisms and procedures in the draft accession agreement will 
take their toll on the process before the Strasbourg court. What may already 
be considered a long procedure will with the current draft, in cases where 
either the EU or the Member States are involved as co-respondents, not only 
become even longer but likely also more cumbersome for the individual 
applicant. In this regard, it would be especially unfortunate if the ECtHR 
were to maintain status quo with regard to the doctrine of equivalent 
protection as, in such cases, the accession of the Union would likely be 
more to the detriment of the individuals whose rights the Convention 
protects, rather than to their benefit.  
Going back to where it all began, looking to the rationale behind Union 
accession to the ECtHR, it must be acknowledged that, in the long term, 
accession will be a significant step forward for fundamental rights within 
Europe. No doubt will the accession represent an advancement of the 
European integration process and be a “further step towards political 
Union” and accession will likely increase the legitimacy and credibility of 
the Union in the eyes of third countries and the Member States in questions 
of fundamental rights. Importantly, the gap in fundamental rights protection 
where the acts of the institutions of the European Union previously did not 
fall within the scope of the ECtHRs jurisdiction will be closed. It remains to 
  54 
be seen whether the accession will lead to a more coherent human rights 
regime within Europe as this is still contingent upon the attitude and 
relationship between the two European Courts. Considering the direction of 
development of fundamental rights protection within Europe the last few 
decades however, a better formulation of that question might instead be 
whether accession will noticeably “speed up” the coherence of rights 
between the two European fundamental rights regimes.  
 
With that said, there is no denying that the process of accession seems to 
have been almost as smooth as trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. 
To chime in with some other commentators
225
, it seems fair to question 
whether EU accession to the ECHR has been the best hole to sink time and 
resources for the benefits of fundamental rights within Europe considering 
the current workload of the ECtHR. While it is too late to look back, 
hopefully it won’t be too long until the European citizens can reap the fruits 
of all the work put into accession. 
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